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This paper has three aims:
1. to emphasize the importance of the mechanisms for the 'institutionalization
of expertise’ to understand the actual functioning of political and administrative systems
2. to outline the actual degree of institutional recognition of policy analysis and
evaluation (PA & E) in Italy, in a comparative perspective
3. to identify the causes and effects of the substantial absence of this discipline
among the analytical ‘tools of government’ in our country.
The arguments shown here are based on a research that has analyzed the functions
and influence of the agencies created to provide governments and parliaments with the
technical  knowledge  to  accomplish  their  tasks.  More  precisely,  the  survey  focuses  on  the
quali-quantitative comparison of three national cases: United States, United Kingdom, and
Italy, which have been investigated at the level of both central government and
infranational government, namely the US states, Scotland, and the Italian regions.
The study of the legislatures has been concluded (Regonini, 2012a, 2012b) while the
research on technical structures at the service of the executives in the same three countries
is still in progress. The results so far confirm the same findings.
1
Four disciplinary approaches
The first task of our research has been to trace the process of institutionalization of
expertise (Johnson et al, 1995), through the analysis of the competencies recognized as
usable knowledge (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979) in the public decisions. Based on the
evidence gathered, four disciplinary approaches deserve special attention, namely
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Their  relevance  is  confirmed  both from a diachronic and a synchronic
perspective.
From a diachronic viewpoint, this ‘quadrilateral of institutionalised expertise’ is the
outcome of complex dynamics arising from the main Western societies.
1. A historical overview of the interaction between the development of the modern
state and the institutionalization of these disciplines must primarily be related to the
development of public law in its various aspects. Indeed, the first qualification given to the
post-absolutist state is ‘rule of law’, i.e. the state must abide by the principle of legality
(Hayek, 1978; O'Donnell, 2004). In this project, we will refer to this competence
framework as ‘law’.
2. The second analytic perspective is public finance, broadly intended as public
economics, accounting and budgeting ... From a historical point of view, the separation of
the  Treasury  from the  king's  coffers,  and  the  taxing  and  spending  limits  imposed  on  the
government were fundamental objectives of the democratic revolutions, in particular in the
United Kingdom, France, North America. The removal of discretion in public money
management required new institutions and new expertise in order to guarantee the accuracy
of public accounting practices (Webber & Wildavsky, 1986; Hopwood & Miller, 1994). In
this project these aspects will be referred to as ‘budget’.
3. Since the end of the 19th century and during the 20th century, the emergence of
bureaucratic organizations in Europe and the United States based upon specialization,
fairness and merit promotion marks a significant benchmark in the history of institutions
following the emergence of the administrative state (Lynn, 2006). The versatility of the
term ‘management’ – referring to either a function, or those people carrying out that
function,  or the expertise to make the function more effective – is  a  sign of the complex
interaction between the institution building process and the knowledge building process.
4. The emergence of the policy-oriented, or output (Peters, 2011), or problem
solving (Briggs, 2008) democracy, is a more gradual process. In certain ways, all the public
institutions  have  always  had  the  role  of  policy  makers,  at  least  to  meet  the  community’s
basic needs, such as defense and public hygiene. Executives and legislatures - for instance
ministries and parliamentary committees - are traditionally organized into policy areas.
However, what has changed in the last two decades is that these institutions have explicitly
recognized policy analysis and evaluation as tools to assess the value of their decisions
(Wittrock  et  al.,  1991).  In  this  context,  the  term ‘policy’  is  not  just  a  generic  synonym to
government intervention in a field, ‘whatever governments choose to do or not to do’ as
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Dye stated (1987: 1), but it refers to the explicit responsibility to produce useful knowledge
to solve socially relevant problems (Dror, 1971).
The formal recognition of the PA&E as a fourth discipline for framing public
decisions is confirmed not only by the rough diachronic reconstruction put forward in the
last paragraph, but also by a synchronic analysis of the expertise recommended and
endorsed by international organizations, such as the World Bank (1992), Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (1995), International Monetary Fund (1997).
Their guidelines to good governance (Kaufmann et al., 2005; Van Kersbergen et al,
2004, OECD 2009) prescribe the development of non-majoritarian institutions with the
task of ex-ante advising and ex-post assessment of the decisions competing to governments
and parliaments. Their function is to ensure:
- the compliance with the rule of law
- a strict audit of any public expenditure
- a continuous assessment of the management
performances




The processes whereby these four disciplines have gained an institutional role
follow specific patterns in every country. But the international diffusion of the English
terms used to identify the last two paradigms (management, policy) shows how much this
process has been deeply influenced by the Anglo-American model. In fact, the emergence
of policy paradigm in the contemporary governmentality (Foucault, 1991) is mainly rooted
on the American political and institutional context. Since the 80s, the United Kingdom has
adopted this ‘ontology’ to organize, intervene in, and account for public decisions.
In fact the American and British political institutions, although they are so different
for powers, electoral mechanisms, party systems, internal operating rules, historical
heritage, are good examples of the use of this kind of knowledge, with its set of rules, its
standards and methods.
Of  course  this  does  not  imply  that  in  these  countries  the  real  application  of  this
approach has always been effective, useful, capable of producing the intended results. It is
just to recognize the genealogy of this kind of knowledge.
Both in the US and in the UK, the crucial phases in the institutionalization of the
policy paradigm have been accompanied by a strong demand for collaboration and support
for the corresponding epistemic community. Following the 1993 National Performance Review
in the US, a project  was launched to develop ‘a  formal discipline of program design (...)’.
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This  project  would  be  funded  through  the  National  Science  Foundation.  External
participants in this effort should include established sources of relevant expertise such as
the National Academy of Public Administration, the Brookings Institution, universities,
and other public policy analysis organizations’ (National Performance Review, 1993).
At the beginning of the last decade, in order to guarantee an adequate contribution
from the so called ‘government analytical professions’, the Government Social Research Service
(GSR)  was  established  in  the  UK  as  a  network  of  social  researchers  within  and  without
government whose aim was to
- ‘provide government with objective, reliable, relevant and timely social
research
- support the development, implementation, review and evaluation of policy
and delivery
- ensure policy debate is informed by the best research evidence and thinking
from the social sciences’1.
3
Italy: the missing paradigm
In Romance-speaking countries, the institutional acknowledgement of the policy
paradigm has been slower and more difficult.
The Italian case is particularly interesting because it has remained largely impervious
to these processes of disciplinary diversification. The very low degree of institutionalization
of the policy sciences in Italy is even more impressive since France, with the Constitutional
Law  passed  on  July  23rd  2008,  redefined  the  role  of  its  Parliament  as  follows:  ‘the
Parliament shall pass statutes. It shall monitor the action of the Government. It shall assess
public policies’ (art. 24, par. 12).
Many factors work against the use of policy analysis and evaluation in the
institutions of our country. Most of them are related to the particular relationship between
politics and policy in Italy.
First, it must be mentioned a linguistic factor: the Italian language has a single word
-  'politica'  -  to  mean  both:  ‘politics’  and  ‘policy’.  This  fact  makes  it  very  difficult  to
recognize the autonomy of the technical skills required for policy analysis and evaluation.
So the first meaning - politics - clearly overpowers the second - policy. The mere fact of
calling public policies with terms such ‘measures’, ‘interventions’, ‘reforms’ implies that the
release of these choices from a disciplinary anchor - because there is no such a thing as a
‘science of interventions’, or an ‘international journal of comparative measures’ - delivers
1 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr
2 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp
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them entirely to the responsibility of the political actors.
Other factors to consider are:
- a political culture marked by ideological conflicts, which leaves little room
for problem solving and pragmatism;
- an inefficient bureaucracy, without the autonomy and the prestige of the
French or German administrations (to name two examples from the
Continent).
As a result of all these elements, the presence of non-partisan expertise in
institutions is very poor:
- the spoil system is pervasive
- state agencies operating on a non-majoritarian logic are rare
- the data available to researchers and public are sparse, uneven, difficult to
reuse.
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to identify only in the dominance of politics the
unique cause of the poor institutionalization of policy analysis and evaluation in Italy.
An equally important factor is the firmness through which the epistemic
communities gathered around the paradigms of 'law' and 'budget' defend their conquered
areas in research agencies of the legislative and the executive, overseeing the boundaries of
their ‘professional jurisdictions’ (Abbott 1988).
Moreover, their disciplinary approaches can rely on a system of enforcement that
has in the Administrative Courts and in the Court of Accounts the undisputed masters to
judge the correctness of public decisions.
4
Severe consequences
The effects of this kind of knowledge provision are relevant.
- The organization of public interventions lacks any consistent articulation
based on policies, programs, projects.
- Public decisions take only the narrow forms of laws and appropriations.
- For a researcher or a citizen, it is impossible to find an explicit definition of:
o what is the problem
o which theory stays behind the intervention
o what results are to be achieved in which timeframe
o what evidence will be considered to assess their success.
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Under these conditions, some of the hallmarks of good governance cannot be
applied.
1.  It  is  impossible  to  learn  from  the  mistakes  and  past  experiences,  because  the
failure assessment criteria are based on inadequate parameters. If you do not know
- the problem which government intervention would face
- the expected results
- the indicators to measure them
monitoring and ex post evaluation are precluded.
If  every law is  a  story on its  own, the only criterion to evaluate it  is  its  degree of
compliance.
If any expense is just an output of the state budget, the only criterion to evaluate it
is the dynamics of the amount of it.
There  are  some  timid  exceptions  to  this  rule  at  the  regional  level,  thanks  to  a
project that aims to include precise evaluation clauses into the most relevant laws.
Lombardy is one of the regions with extensive experience in this attempt. But it is a drop in
the ocean.
2. Our political system knows only one type of accountability: electoral, or vertical,
or majoritarian accountability.
- voters express their preferences
- who gets the majority, is in office for a predetermined period of time
- at the end of the term they return to voters and ask for their approval.
During the term, whenever the political or economic backdrop to the election
program change, whenever policy promises fail or grows to be inadequate, government
decisions become opaque and unverifiable.
In fact, our institutional system does not provide for 'horizontal' (O'Donnell 2003)
-  not  electoral  -  accountability,  based  on  an  effective  exercise  of  legislative  oversight
through the parliament watchdogs. And there is no independent technical agency to
account for the administrative performances.
When problems become dramatic and political routines prove to be impotent, we
resort to ‘technical governments’ as a method for supplying missing skills to our
institutions.
3. In this situation, even the exercise of civic participation and what is often called
'social accountability' is really very difficult. When public decisions only take the form of
twisted pieces of legislation or arcane budget rules, it is very hard for citizens and for the
old and new media to bear the costs of information required to understand the causes and
effects of government choices, to assess them and to submit alternative proposals.
REGONINI/ Policy Analysis in Italy
7
5
An overload on the other disciplines
The last remark concerns the effect that the absence of the 'policy' paradigm
produces on other disciplines, which are already recognized as governmental sciences.
The fact that our fourth analytical perspective is missing charges the others with
tasks that end up altering the nature of the conceptual and methodological resources that
they possess, reducing their impact.
If we consider the ‘law’ approach, its unconscious application as a substitute for the
fourth paradigm leads to an hypertrophic use of the legal logic, with paradoxical effects.
The hopes of attaining  deregulation and simplification through legal instruments
remember Baron Munchausen who tried to rise from the pond by being held by his hair.
Considering the ‘budget’ approach - the strengthening of which no one can
reasonably criticize, given the past and present of the Italian public finances - the absence
of the fourth paradigm involves a huge difficulty in identifying the costs actually
unproductive and in selecting the expenditures that are, instead, real social investment in
the medium and long term.
If the ‘policy’ paradigm is not available, it is difficult to overcome the logic of linear
cuts, with all the subsequent negative effects in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and equity
of public action. And objectives such as growth and development are likely to become
mythical  words,  when  the  scarcity  of  resources  would  require  a  surgical  precision  in  the
design of intervention projects.
At the beginning of the paragraph, with reference to the Italian case we discussed
only one missing paradigm, that of policy, thereby crediting the successful
institutionalization of the 'management' approach. In fact, this recognition is only in its
infancy, and there is strong pressure towards its assimilation within the logic of ‘law’
and/or ‘budget’. And this is another problem, because the development of the two last
disciplines offering an autonomous interpretations of what is happening in the public
sector is closely interconnected (Lynn 2006, Talbot 2010).
Certainly, terms like ‘program’, ‘performance’, ‘output’, ‘outcome’ refer to concepts
and parameters which are different when talking about management or policy. But it is also
true that, if one disciplinary approach does not display its own analytical tools, the other
will be affected, because ‘organizational design and policy analysis are part of the same
governmental process’ (Wildavsky, 1992: 232).
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